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The federal gift tax was first during his life, rather than by
enacted in 1924, approximately reference only to taxable gifts
eight years after the adoption of made in a given year.
the estate tax. As originally en-
acted, the tax was largely ineffec- OVERLAP OF TAXES
tive because it was computed on The 1932 gift tax was intended
an annual basis without regard to complement the income and es-
to gifts made in prior years. tate tax laws by discouraging tax-
The tax was repealed in 1926, payers from making inter vivos
revived in 1932, and has remained gifts for the purpose of either re-
in effect since that date. Unlike its ducing their taxable estates, or
predecessor, the 1932 tax was reducing their taxable incomes, or
computed on a cumulative basis both. While the gift tax does
-that is, the tax rates applicable supplement both the income and
to a gift were determined by ref- estate tax laws, the three taxes
erence to the total amount of overlap to some extent and the
taxable gifts made by the donor treatment accorded a given trans-
EDITOR'S NOTE: This discussion is drawn from two chapters in the recently pub-
lished ALI-ABA Handbook, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS, AND TRUSTS, by
Douglas A. Kahn, Earl M. Colson, and George Craven (ALI-ABA Joint Committee
on Continuing Legal Education, 4025 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., 1970);
paperbound, 366 pp.,. $9.50 (plus 48 cents for postage and handling).
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action in the application of the
three taxes is not necessarily
consistent.
Initial Questions
Thus, where a gift is made, the
donor must resolve three separate
questions:
o Whether the transfer is one on
which gift tax is imposed;
o Whether the transferred prop-
erty will be included in the donor's
estate on his death, notwithstand-
ing the inter vivos transfer; and
* Whether the transfer constituted
a taxable exchange that is subject
to income tax.
A fourth and related question
arises when the transfer is made
in trust: Whether the income from
the transferred property will be
included in the taxable income of
the donor or whether instead it will
be included in the income of the
recipient of the property.
It is quite possible that property
transferred by a donor will be sub-
jected to a gift tax and also in-
cluded in the taxable estate of the
donor at his death. For example,
a transfer in contemplation of
death is a taxable gift; yet if the
donor should die within three years
after making the gift, the trans-
ferred property is included in his
gross estate. Similarly, a transfer
of property in which the donor
retains a life interest is subject to
both gift and estate taxes.
Differing Definitions
The definition of the term "gift"
is quite different in the gift and in-
come tax laws. Farid-Es-Sultaneh
v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1947).
Thus, subject to a statutory
exception for certain circum-
stances [INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
hereinafter, IRC) §2516], a hus-
band's transfer of property to his
wife in exchange for her relin-
quishing her marital rights is a
taxable gift for gift tax purposes.
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
(1954). Nevertheless, such a trans-
fer is not treated as a gift for
income tax purposes, and the hus-
band is subject to income tax
on any appreciated property so
transferred to his wife. United
States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
In Commissioner v. Beck's Es-
tate [129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir.
1942)], Judge Frank noted the con-
fusion engendered by the inde-
pendent construction of the three
taxes and wryly suggested as a
solution that "Congress might use
different symbols to describe the
taxable conduct in the several
statutes, calling it a 'gift' in the gift
tax law, a 'gaft' in the income tax
law, and a 'geft' in the estate tax
law."
In sum, the treatment of a trans-
action for income or estate tax pur-
poses is not necessarily consistent
December
HeinOnline  -- 16 Prac. Law. 36 1970
TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL GIFT TAX 37
with the gift tax consequences, and
therefore undue reliance should
not be placed upon the provisions
and interpretations of the other
two tax laws when determining gift
tax liability.
DEFINITION OF "GIFT"
UNDER GIFT TAX
The gift tax is imposed on the
"transfer of property by gift." IRC
§2501. The term "gift" is not
expressly defined either in the
Code or in the Regulations.
However, IRC §2512(b), deal-
ing with the valuation of gifts,
states that "where property is trans-
ferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money
or money's worth," the difference
between the value of the property
transferred and the consideration
received constitutes a gift.
Thus, for gift tax purposes, the
determination of whether a gift
was made does not turn so much
on the intent of the transferor as
it does on the mechanics of the
transfer-that is, whether property
was transferred without full and
adequate consideration in money
and money's worth. Treas. Reg.
§25.2511-1(g)(1). However, as
shown below, the absence of
donative intent is a significant
factor in certain circumstances.
The gift tax applies only to
transfers by individuals, but a
transfer of property by an entity
such as a corporation may be
attributed to individuals (such as
the corporation's shareholders).
See Treas. Reg. §25.2511 -1(h)(1).
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY
Only the transfer of "property"
is subject to the gift tax. No gift
tax is imposed on account of the
contribution of personal services.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2
CUM. BULL. 21.
Virtually every kind of property,
tangible or intangible, including
state and municipal securities
that are immune from federal
income taxes, is subject to the gift
tax. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(a).
For example, transfers of
royalty rights, life insurance, part-
nership interests, and checks or
notes of third parties are subject
to the gift tax.
Transfers Subject to Tax
The gift tax applies to transfers
of property without full and ade-
quate consideration in money or
money's worth regardless of the
manner in which made. Among
others, the tax applies to indirect
transfers, to transfers in trust, and
to gifts of future interests. How-
ever, an interest-free loan does not
constitute a gift of the amount
of interest that could have been
charged.
Illustration a. F transferred
$100,000 to his son, S, upon S's
promise to pay X, his sister, a
comparable annuity. F has made
an indirect gift of the annuity
1970
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to X. If, however, F made the
gift to S with no obligation; and
S, on his own initiative, made
a comparable gift to X, there are
two gifts: F's gift to S and S's
gift to X, both of which are
taxable events.
Illustration b. If an heir or
beneficiary of an estate refuses
to accept his interest in an es-
tate, he has made a taxable gift
if under the local law he could
not prevent the passage of title
to himself by renouncing. Treas.
Reg. §25.2511-1(c); William L.
Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
(It should be noted that some
states, by statute, permit an heir
to renounce his interest in an
estate, but many states do not
permit renunciation by heirs.)
Even where a beneficiary is
permitted to renounce his in-
terest in an estate, he must
do so within a reasonable time
after learning of the transfer to
avoid gift tax liability. Treas.
Reg. §25.2511-1(c).
Illustration c. F made a bona
fide loan of $200,000 to each
of his children. There was an
agreement by each debtor to
repay the principal amount,
without interest, on demand.
The interest-free loan does not
constitute a gift to the children
of the interest that F might have
charged. Johnson v. United
States, 254 F.Supp. 73 (N.D.
Tex. 1966). However, the de-
cision in Johnson may yet be
repudiated, and considerable
caution is warranted.
Generally, the gift tax applies
only to transfer of property, and
therefore the performance of serv-
ices without compensation does
not constitute a gift. However,
once personal services have been
converted into a property right for
compensation, the forgiveness of
the debt will constitute a gift.
Illustration d. A fiduciary
who waives his right to statutory
commissions after performing
services may be deemed to have
made a gift to the beneficiaries
involved. Rev. Rul. 64-225,
1964-2 CuM. BULL. 15. How-
ever, there is no gift where
the fiduciary waives his right
to commissions either:
* Before commencing his serv-
ices [Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2
CUM. BULL. 21; and see Rev.
Rul. 70-237, 1970 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 20, at 7]; or
* Within a reasonable time after
commencing to serve and where
all the executor's actions are
consistent with a gratuitous per-
formance of services [Rev. Rul.
66-167, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 20].
Illustration e. Forgiving a
debt may constitute a gift. Selsor
December
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R. Haygood, 42 T.C. 936
(1964), acquiesced in result,
1965-1 CuM. BULL. 4. F lent his
son, X, $12,000. Subsequently
F forgave X the debt at a time
when X was not financially
sound and could have paid F
only 50 cents on the dollar.
Assuming that the cancellation
of the debt was donatively moti-
vated, F made a gift to X of the
fair market value of X's obliga-
tion, which might be valued as
low as $6,000.
Illustration f. A owned a life
insurance policy on the life of
B and designated X as bene-
ficiary of the policy. A retained
the power to change the bene-
ficiary of the policy.
Upon the death of B, the
owner of the policy, A, is
deemed to have made a gift to
X, the beneficiary, of the pro-
ceeds of the policy. Goodman
v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218
(2d Cir. 1946). If, however, A
had irrevocably designated X
as the beneficiary and had re-
tained no other beneficial inter-
est in the policy (that is, the
power to surrender the policy
or to borrow against the cash
value), the designation of bene-
ficiary would constitute a com-
pleted gift of an amount equal
to the replacement value of the
policy at the time of designation.
Illustration g. A transferred
property to T in trust to pay
the income to himself for life,
remainder to X. The remainder
interest (determined by deduct-
ing the value of A's income
rights) is a completed gift sub-
ject to the gift tax. The value of
A's income rights at the date of
transfer is determined under
tables set forth in Treas. Reg.
§25.2512-5(f). [On July 3,
1970, the Treasury proposed
new regulations (P-H ESTATE
& GIFT TAXES 142,231) that
would substitute more modern
tables for valuing income in-
terests, remainders, reversions,
terms for years, and similar
interests. ]
APPLICATION OF TAX TO
VARIous TRANSACTIONS
Transfers for Business
Purposes
Transfers for inadequate con-
sideration are not necessarily taxed
as gifts. In particular, those trans-
fers made in the ordinary course
of business are not deemed gifts,
despite the lack of full and ade-
quate consideration. Treas. Reg.
§25.2512-8.
The regulations define a busi-
ness transaction as one that is
"bona fide, at arm's length, and
free from any donative intent."
Accordingly, the gift tax is not im-
posed on the sale of property for
less than its market value where
the seller makes an error in busi-
ness judgment. Carl E. Weller, 38
1970
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T.C. 790 (1962), acquiesced in,
1968-2 CuM. BULL. 3.
Also, where a bargain sale to an
employee is motivated by business
judgment, the transfer is not sub-
ject to the gift tax. Estate of
Monroe D. Anderson, 8 T.C. 706
(1947). Where a transfer of prop-
erty is made for profit motives or
for the purpose of making a bona
fide economic settlement of a claim
against the transferor, the gift tax
is not usually applicable. See
Catherine S. Beveridge, 10 T.C.
915 (1948).
However, contributions to po-
litical organizations and political
action groups are subject to the gift
tax, even though the donor may
hope to profit therefrom. Rev. Rul.
59-57, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 626.
But see, contra, Stern v. United
States, 24 Am. Fed, Tax R.2d 69-
6101 (E.D. La. 1969).
Involuntary Transfers
The gift tax applies only to
voluntary transfers of property.
For example, a payment made
under the compulsion of a tort
judgment does not constitute a gift.
Cf. Harris v. Commissioner, 340
U.S. 106 (1950).
Possibly, such settlements can
be analyzed with similar results
under the Regulations defining
business transactions. Treas. Reg.
§25.2512-8.
Transfers for Consideration
A transfer of property is not
removed from the reach of the gift
tax merely because it was made for
consideration. To be exempt from
the tax, the consideration received
must be equal in value to the prop-
erty transferred and must be re-
ceived "in money or money's
worth." Moral consideration, past
consideration, or consideration in
the form of a detriment to the
transferee that does not benefit the
transferor will not bar the imposi-
tion of the tax.
Illustration. A transferred
$100,000 to X, a widow, upon
her promise to marry him. X's
remarriage would result in her
forfeiting a $100,000 interest
in a trust established by her first
husband, and consequently A
gave her the $100,000 to com-
pensate her for this loss.
There is a gift from A to X.
X's promise to marry A is not
sufficient consideration, because
it cannot be valued in money or
money's worth. Although X's
loss of interest in the trust is a
detriment to her, it does not con-
stitute a benefit to A. Thus,
there is a gift tax on A's trans-
fer. Commissioner v. Wemyss,
324 U.S. 303 (1945).
Relinquishment of Marital Rights
Under the estate tax statutes, the
relinquishment of marital rights
(including dower, curtesy, and
statutory estates in lieu thereof)
does not constitute consideration
in money or money's worth. IRC
§2043(b).
December
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The Supreme Court has applied
this estate tax provision to the gift
tax on the ground that the two
taxes are in pari materia. Merrill
v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945). Ac-
cordingly, a husband's transfer of
property in exchange for his wife's
relinquishment of her marital
rights constitutes a taxable gift to
the wife.
However, under IRC §2516, a
transfer of property from one
spouse to the other pursuant to a
written agreement relative to their
marital and property rights shall
be deemed to have been made for
"full and adequate consideration
in money or money's worth," pro-
vided that the spouses are divorced
within two years after the execu-
tion of the agreement.
While every effort should be
made to comply with IRC §2516
where applicable, if for some rea-
son the terms of the statute are not
satisfied (for example, if the di-
vorce occurs more than two years
after the agreement), the transferor
may contend that a transfer in
anticipation of a divorce is not
voluntarily made and therefore is
exempt from the tax. The Supreme
Court's decision in Harris v. Com-
missioner [340 U.S. 106 (1950)]
provides substantial support for
that contention. See Rosenthal v.
Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d
Cir. 1953).
Right to Support
It now appears settled that a
wife's relinquishment of her right
to support constitutes considera-
tion in "money or money's worth."
The Service has ruled that support
rights are money's worth. Rev.
Rul. 68-379 1968-2 CUM. BULL.
414, superseding E.T. 19, 1946-2
CUM. BULL. 166.
While there are two court de-
cisions involving estate taxes to the
contrary [Meyer's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1940); Estate of Robert Manning
McKeon, 25 T.C. 697, 706-07
(1965), acquiesced in, 1958-2
CUM. BULL. 6], the administra-
tive position of the Service, as
evidenced by its rulings, and the
more recent court decisions clearly
establish that the wife's support
rights qualify as money's worth
consideration. See Estate of
Hubert Keller, 44 T.C. 851
(1965); and Estate of Morrison T.
O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648 (1967),
acquiesced in, 1967-2 CUM.
BULL. 3.
A transfer in satisfaction of the
right to support of the minor
children of the transferor is made
for money's worth. Estate of
Robert Manning McKeon, above.
Support payments to indigent
adult children that are required to
be made by state law were held to
be gifts in Commissioner v. Greene
[119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 641 (1941)].
However, Greene was decided by
a divided Court, and the result is
difficult to rationalize.
1970
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Complete and Incomplete
Transfers
A transfer of property is not
subject to the gift tax unless it is
complete and irrevocable. A trans-
fer that may be revoked by the
donor alone or in conjunction with
any party or parties who do not
have a substantial adverse interest
in the revocation is not a com-
pleted gift for tax purposes. Burnet
v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280
(1933).
Similarly, where the donor has
retained the power (either alone
or in conjunction with others who
do not have a substantial adverse
interest), to change the bene-
ficiaries of the gift, the transfer is
not complete for gift tax purposes.
Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner,
308 U.S. 39 (1939).
Illustration a. A transferred
property to T in trust for A for
life, remainder to B. This is a
completed gift of the remainder
interest, because the donor has
relinquished all control over that
interest. However, if A had re-
tained the power to revoke the
whole trust, there is no gift. If
A can revoke only with the con-
sent of T, who does not have a
substantial adverse interest,
there is no completed gift. If A
can revoke only with B's con-
sent, then the gift is complete.
The mere delivery without con-
sideration of a personal check or
note of the transferor himself does
not constitute a completed gift be-
cause no enforceable obligation
is incurred. The Service has stated
that the transfer of a personal
check becomes complete and
therefore taxable when it is paid,
certified,or accepted by the drawee,
or is negotiated for value to a third
person.
Similarly, payment or transfer
for value is necessary to complete
a gift of a negotiable note. Rev.
Rul. 67-396, 1967-2 CUM. BULL.
351.
While there exists a conflict
among the court decisions that
have passed on these transfers
[compare John D. Archbold, 42
B.T.A. 453 (1940) with Commis-
sioner v. Copley's Estate, 194 F.2d
364 (7th Cir. 1952), affg 15 T.C.
17 (1950)], the more recent de-
cisions support the Service. E.g.,
Commissioner v. Copley's Estate,
above, and Eleanor A. Bradford,
34 T.C. 1059, 1065 (1960). See
Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 25, at 24.
Completed Transfers
Where the donor's power to
alter or revoke the transfer can be
exercised only with the consent of
a party with a substantially adverse
interest, the transfer is complete
for gift tax purposes. Commis-
sioner v. Prouty, 115 F.2d 331
(1st Cir. 1940).
Illustration b. A transferred
December
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property to T in trust for C for
life, remainder to D, and A re-
served the power to alter or
amend the trust as he sees fit.
The transfer is not complete, so
there is no taxable gift.
If, however, A later amends
the trust so that he can exercise
the power of further amendment
only with the consent of C, there
will then be a complete transfer
and a taxable gift on C's life
estate, but not as to D's re-
mainder interest. The gift of
C's life estate is effected on the
date that the amendment was
made. C does not have an ad-
verse interest as to A's altera-
tion of the remainder interest
in the trust, so the requirement
that C consent to such altera-
tions does not render complete
the transfer of the remainder
interest in the trust.
Where the donor's reserved
power to alter a transfer can
effect only the time when the trans-
ferred property will be received
by the beneficiaries, there is a
completed gift at the date of the
transfer. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-
2(d).
Illustration c. A transferred
property to T in trust to pay the
income annually to B for 20
years, and at the end of that
period, to distribute the corpus
to B or to B's estate. A retained
the power to direct T to accumu-
late the income in any year and
to distribute it together with the
corpus after the expiration of
the 20-year period. B's interest
in the trust is vested and only
the timing of enjoyment is sub-
ject to change. Therefore, A has
made a completed gift, which is
subject to the gift tax.
It should be noted that when the
grantor has a power to revoke sub-
ject to the approval of an adverse
party, or when he has the power
to affect the timing of enjoyment
of the transfer, the property is in-
cludible in the gross estate of the
donor at his death under IRC
§2038, even though the transfer
is treated as a completed gift.
Relinquishment of Power
Where a donor retains a power
(such as the power to revoke) pre-
venting a transfer from constituting
a completed gift, the subsequent
relinquishment of that power by
the grantor creates a gift at the
date of relinquishment. Treas.
Reg. §25.2511-2(f).
Similarly, where income from
an incomplete transfer is paid to
a beneficiary and thus placed be-
yond the control of the donor,
there is a completed gift of the
income at the date of payment.
Illustration d. A declared
himself trustee of certain prop-
erties owned by him. Under the
declaration of trust, the trustee
1970
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is to distribute the income
quarterly between B and C in
such proportions as the trustee
shall determine in his discretion.
Upon the death of the survivor
of B and C, the trust corpus is
to be distributed to X or his
estate. The trust is irrevocable.
Since A retained the power
as trustee to change the propor-
tionate interests of B and C, the
gift of the income interests was
incomplete and consequently A
incurred no gift tax liability
therefor. However,the gift of the
remainder interest to X was
complete.
Subsequently, A resigned,
and T was appointed as trustee
in A's place. Since A's power
over the income interest was
terminated by his resignation,
the gift of the income interest
became complete at that date.
Prior to the resignation of A,
any income that was actually
distributed to B or C was placed
beyond A's power of control,
and consequently there was a
completed gift of distributed in-
come on the date of distribution
from the trust.
Joint Bank Accounts
One of the most commonly
recurring examples of an incom-
plete transfer is the creation of
a joint bank account. Since the
grantor alone may withdraw any
or all of the funds from the joint
account, he has retained a power
of revocation and there is no
completed gift.
However, when the donee actu-
ally withdraws funds from the
account and thereby removes those
funds from the control of the grant-
or, there is a gift of the funds in
question at the date of withdrawal.
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(h)(4).
Of course, if local law required
the donee to return the withdrawn
funds upon the donor's demand,
the gift would not be complete on
withdrawal. But if the donor fails
to demand return of the funds, at
some subsequent date the donor's
inaction may be deemed his ac-
quiescence in the withdrawal,
which will then be a completed gift.
Similarly, if A purchases a
United States savings bond regis-
tered as payable to "A or B," there
is no gift to B unless and until B
surrenders the bond for cash.
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(h)(4).
Retained Interests
Reversionary Interests and Life
Estates
Transfers of property in which
the donor retains a reversionary
interest are subject to the gift tax.
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S.
176 (1943).
Illustration a. F transferred
property to T in trust for X for
life, remainder to X's children
who are living at X's death.
There is a valid gift of the re-
mainder even though X might
December
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not have children at the time of
the transfer, and if there are
children, they might not survive
X, thus creating the possibility
that the property may revert to
F on X's death.
In this event, the value of the
donor's reversionary interest must
be deducted from the property
transferred in order to determine
the value of the gift. The donor has
the burden of proving the value of
his retained interest; and if his
interest is so speculative as to have
no ascertainable value under
recognized actuarial methods, the
amount of the gift is treated as
equal to the entire value of the
property transferred. Robinette
v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
Similarly, if the donor retains
a life estate in the transferred prop-
erty, the gift tax will be imposed
on the value of the remainder. Id.
It should be noted that the reten-
tion of a life estate will cause the
inclusion of the transferred prop-
erty in the gross estate of the donor
upon his death, notwithstanding
that the transfer was previously
taxed under the gift tax laws.
IRC §2036.
Power of Third Party To Invade
on Behalf of Donor
Where the donor has transferred
property in trust and where a
nonadverse third party (for ex-
ample, an independent trustee) has
the discretionary power to make
distributions of principal or in-
come to the donor, the gift tax
consequences will depend upon
the extent of the third party's
discretion.
If the discretionary power of
the third party to make distribu-
tions to the grantor is limited by
an external standard, then the
donor's contingent interest must
be valued as of the date of transfer;
and the amount of the completed
gift is deemed to be the value of
the property transferred in trust
less the value of the donor's con-
tingent interest. Rev. Rul. 54-538,
1954-2 CuM. BULL. 316.
Where the external standards
are so encompassing that there is
no limit on the amount of trust
corpus that might be distributed
to the donor, the gift will be treated
as incomplete. See Estate of Leon
Holtz, 38 T.C. 37 (1962), ac-
quiesced in, 1962-2 CUM. BULL.
4; and Commissioner v. Vander
Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir.
1958), affg 27 T.C. 340, ac-
quiesced in, 1962-2 CUM. BULL.
4. See also Rev. Rul. 62-13,
1962-1 CUM. BULL. 181.
The Service has ruled that where
a third party is given very broad
discretion to make distributions
of principal to the donor (includ-
ing transfers where the third
party's power to invade is not
limited by external standards) so
that there is no assurance at the
time of transfer that anything of
value will pass to a beneficiary of
1970
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the trust, the gift is not complete
for gift tax purposes. Rev. Rul.
62-13, above. But see Herzog v.
Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d
Cir. 1941).
Voidable and Void Transfers
If the transferor of property is
incompetent, his attempted trans-
fer is void and no gift tax is im-
posed. However, a gift tax will be
imposed upon a gift made by an
incompetent's lawfully appointed
guardian who was authorized to
make the gift on behalf of the
incompetent. Rev. Rul. 67-280,
1967-2 CUM. BULL. 349.
If the transferor of property is
under a temporary disability (such
as infancy), and if the transferor
can affirm or rescind the transfer
when the disability has been re-
moved, there is no gift at the time
of transfer, but a gift will be
deemed to have been made when
the transferor's disability is re-
moved and he does not rescind the
transfer within a reasonable time.
Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F.2d
961 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 680 (1940).
It is not clear whether a transfer
that is voidable for reasons other
than disability, as for example, a
transfer voidable under the Statute
of Frauds, is subject to the gift tax
when made.
NONRESIDENT ALIENS
For 1967 and succeeding years,
a nonresident who is not a
citizen is exempt from the gift
tax on transfers of intangible prop-
erty [IRC §2501(a)]; but this
exemption from gift tax may not
apply to gifts made by a donor
within 10 years after having lost
his American citizenship [IRC
§2501(a)(3)].
However, the gift tax does apply
to transfers by a nonresident not
a citizen of real property and
tangible personal property located
in the United States. A resident is
a person who was domiciled in the
United States at the time of the
gift. Treas. Reg. §25.2501-1(b).
ANNUITY BENEFITS
If an annuitant acquires an
annuity for himself that contains
a provision for a survivorship
annuity or for a refund upon the
death of the annuitant, a taxable
gift from the annuitant to the bene-
ficiary entitled to survivorship or
refund benefits is made on the date
that the designation of such bene-
ficiary becomes irrevocable. See
Treas. Reg. §25.2512-6, Ex. (5);
I.T. 3322, 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 177;
and Wagner v. United States, 387
F.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
However, no gift tax is imposed
where an irrevocable designation
of the beneficiary is made by an
employee entitled to an annuity
under certain qualified deferred
compensation plans, except to the
extent that the value of the annuity
is attributable to contributions of
the employee. IRC §2517.
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